Exploring the Dynamics of Collective Cognition Using a Computational Model of Cognitive Dissonance by Smart, Paul et al.
Exploring the Dynamics of Collective Cognition Using a
Computational Model of Cognitive Dissonance
Paul R. Smarta, Katia Sycarab and Darren P. Richardsona
aSchool of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton, SO17
1BJ, UK;
bRobotics Institute, School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes
Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890, US
ABSTRACT
The socially-distributed nature of cognitive processing in a variety of organizational settings means that there is
increasing scientic interest in the factors that aect collective cognition. In military coalitions, for example, there
is a need to understand how factors such as communication network topology, trust, cultural dierences and the
potential for miscommunication aects the ability of distributed teams to generate high quality plans, to formulate
eective decisions and to develop shared situation awareness. The current paper presents a computational model
and associated simulation capability for performing in silico experimental analyses of collective sensemaking.
This model can be used in combination with the results of human experimental studies in order to improve our
understanding of the factors that inuence collective sensemaking processes.
Keywords: collective cognition, social information processing, distributed cognition, cognitive dissonance, social
in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1. INTRODUCTION
The socially-distributed nature of tasks such as intelligence analysis and military planning means that there is
increasing scientic interest in how collective cognitive capabilities are aected by the features of collaborative
work environments. In military coalitions, for example, there is a need to understand how factors such as
communication network topology, trust, cultural dierences and the potential for miscommunication aect the
ability of distributed teams to generate high quality plans, to formulate eective decisions and to develop shared
situation awareness.
Typically, research into collective cognition has been undertaken using two very dierent approaches. Firstly,
social psychological research has tended to focus on small groups of human individuals who are observed in
a particular task context. The advantage of this approach is that it uses real human subjects to test research
hypotheses. However, the research also suers from a number of disadvantages: it is often limited to small groups
with minimally complex communication structures, and it focuses on tasks that do not necessarily generalize to
real-world situations. The other approach to collective cognition research has focused on the use of computer
simulation techniques. This approach is potentially well-suited to the study of collective cognitive processes in
organizational settings because it avoids some of the diculties associated with the running of large-scale social
experiments. It also enables the research community to explore `what-if' scenarios involving the systematic ma-
nipulation of variables that would be dicult or impossible to manipulate in real-world situations. Despite the
advantages, however, there are a number of problems associated with the use of computer simulations to inves-
tigate collective cognition. One problem concerns the psychological interest and relevance of the computational
models used in the studies. In many cases, for example, the agents used in simulation studies are represented
by single, time-variant numerical values, and they lack any kind of internal cognitive processing complexity.
This has encouraged some to argue in favor of socio-cognitive simulations in which agents are endowed with
psychologically-realistic cognitive processing capabilities.1
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sive body of work in the psychological literature. The model features the use of constraint satisfaction networks
(CSNs) to model one particular form of collective cognition, namely collective sensemaking. Collective sense-
making is a phenomenon of considerable importance in a number of dierent task contexts, such as intelligence
analysis,2 military planning3 and healthcare provision.4 It tends to emerge in any situation where a group or
team of individuals is required to pool their cognitive resources in the attempt to interpret conicting, complex,
incomplete and uncertain bodies of data. Collective sensemaking is of particular importance to military coalitions
because sensemaking processes sit at the heart of the vision of network-centric operations (NCO). According to
the NCO Conceptual Framework, for example, sensemaking at both the individual and collective levels has a
direct impact on decision synchronization, force agility and mission eectiveness.5 This makes research into
collective sensemaking of vital importance to military coalition organizations.6
The main aim of the current paper is to provide an overview of the aforementioned computational model of
collective sensemaking (see Section 3). The computational model is based on a previous CSN-based model, which
has been used to explore the psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance.7 The relevance of both cognitive
dissonance and CSNs to the modeling of sensemaking processes is discussed in Section 2. The paper also presents
a simulation capability that has been developed to support users in conguring and executing experimental
simulations (see Section 4). This capability can be used by researchers to undertake their own investigations into
collective sensemaking. Finally, Section 5 describes a number of ways in which the computational model could
be used to investigate the impact of factors such as trust, communication network topology, miscommunication
and cultural dierences on collective sensemaking processes.
2. COLLECTIVE SENSEMAKING, COGNITIVE DISSONANCE AND
CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION NETWORKS
2.1 Collective Sensemaking
Sensemaking is, at heart, a cognitive activity: it is an activity that involves the processing of information in order
to yield an outcome (i.e., understanding) that is recognizably cognitive in nature. This does not mean, however,
that sensemaking is an activity that only individuals engage in. There is a growing appreciation of the prevalence
and importance of what might be called `collective sensemaking'6 or `team sensemaking';8 i.e., the activities that
are performed by groups of individuals in order to develop understanding at both the individual and collective
levels. Collective sensemaking is an example of socially-distributed cognition, or collective cognition, in which the
processes that yield an understanding of some state-of-aairs are distributed across multiple individuals. As with
other cases of distributed cognitive processing, there are a number of reasons why collective sensemaking may be
important in an organizational context. One reason is that the complexity of the available information may be
such that no one individual has the relevant knowledge or expertise to properly interpret it. Dierent individuals
may possess specialist knowledge and expertise, and the involvement of these individuals may be necessary in
order for a group to make sense of some larger body of information. Another reason why collective sensemaking
is important is that dierent individuals may have access to dierent bodies of information. In a military
coalition environment, for example, dierent individuals may have access to dierent sources of information
(e.g., particular sensor systems or databases) by virtue of their position in organizational structures. Individuals
may also have dierent abilities when it comes to the eective probing of the information environment and
the elicitation of cues which serve to guide interpretational processes. In medical diagnosis, for example, one
individual may rely on another to provide specialist diagnostic data, while in intelligence analysis, dierent
individuals may have dierent expertise in retrieving information from particular intelligence sources. A nal
reason why individuals may resort to collective sensemaking strategies is because it builds redundancy into the
sensemaking process. Any errors or omissions that might be made by one individual have a greater chance of
being detected or compensated for by the eorts of others.
2.2 Constraint Satisfaction Networks
Our approach to the computational modeling of sensemaking processes is based on the use of CSNs, which are
typically used to study constraint satisfaction problems. Using CSNs, a constraint satisfaction problem can be
modeled as a set of inter-connected nodes, with the weight assigned to the linkages between nodes indicating therelative importance of constraints that must be satised as part of the problem-solving process. The problem-
solving process itself typically assumes the form of spreading activation between the nodes, and the solution to
the problem is given as the activation vector across all nodes after a specied number of processing cycles has
elapsed.
There are a number of reasons that motivate the use of CSNs to study sensemaking processes. One reason
relates to the fact that sensemaking (or at least some parts of the sensemaking process) can be cast as a
form of constraint satisfaction problem. In particular, the ability to interpret (make sense of) information
(especially when that information is incomplete, uncertain, ambiguous or conicting) can be seen as a form of
constraint satisfaction in which an agent attempts to establish a consistent or coherent set of beliefs subject to
the constraints imposed by background knowledge, initial expectations and received information. The notion
of cognitive consistency or coherence is important here because CSNs have been used to model psychological
processes in which issues of coherence and consistency play a major role.9 As an example, CSNs have been
used to study the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, in which the process of cognitive change (e.g., belief
modication) is driven by a need for consistency or compatibility between particular cognitions (e.g., beliefs).7
A second reason to countenance CSNs relates to the previous use of such networks in psychological modeling
contexts. CSNs have been used to model a wide variety of psychological phenomena, including belief revision,
impression formation, explanation, schema completion, analogical reasoning, causal attribution, discourse com-
prehension, content-addressable memories, cognitive dissonance and attitude change.10{15 This grounding in
psychological research helps to improve the psychological plausibility and relevance of simulation results, which
is an issue of considerable importance for those interested in developing computational models of socially-situated
or socially-distributed cognition.1,16 Sun,1 for example, claims that \Most of the work in social simulation as-
sumes rudimentary cognition on the part of agents" (pg. 34). He advocates the use of psychologically-rich models
to improve the cognitive delity of computer simulations and improve our understanding of real-world collective
behavior and social phenomena.
A third reason motivating the use of CSNs centers on the previous use of such networks to explore the dynamics
of collective sensemaking. In particular, Hutchins17 has used CSNs to examine the psychological phenomenon of
conrmation bias; i.e., the tendency to ignore or discount evidence that contradicts some initial interpretation
of a situation. Using CSNs, Hutchins was able to show that the timing of inter-agent communication exerts
a signicant inuence on the dynamics of collective sensemaking. In particular, if the individual agents were
allowed to communicate with one another from the outset of a simulation, then extreme levels of conrmation
bias arose. This occurred because each agent, under the inuence of information provided by other agents in
the social network, was under pressure to discover a shared interpretation of the input data. In other words,
the community of agents strove to nd a set of activation patterns that best satised the internal constraints
established by inter-agent communication. The result was that agents often failed to give due weight to the
evidence provided by external input, and thus, more often than not, the community of agents tended to exhibit
more extreme forms of conrmation bias than was the case with isolated individuals.
2.3 Cognitive Dissonance and Sensemaking
In using CSNs to model sensemaking processes, a variety of decisions need to be made concerning the specic
kind of CSN to use for modeling purposes. The CSNs used in the current model (see Section 3) are based on
those developed by Schultz and Lepper7 as part of their work into the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance.18,19
Cognitive dissonance is characterized as a state of psychological discomfort or tension that arises as a result of
a mismatch or conict between cognitions and observed behavior. In order to resolve the state of psychological
It should be noted that the current model does not capture all the richness and complexity of the sensemaking
process as seen in real-world situations. In particular, it does not consider the role of knowledge-guided interactions with
the real-world in order to make sense of conicting, uncertain or ambiguous information. In most cases of real-world
sensemaking, human agents actively engage with the external environment in order to support their ongoing attempts at
pattern recognition and pattern completion. Human agents engaged in sensemaking do not just react passively to the
information they receive, they also seek to manipulate their information environments in ways that meliorate their access
to hidden patterns, relationships and contingencies.tension, the subject is motivated to either change their behavior or (more typically) cognitions in order to
re-establish consistency.
The notion of cognitive dissonance has been used to account for the cognitive changes observed in subjects who
engage in counterattitudinal behavior. Linder et al,20 for example, asked college students to write a forceful essay
supporting a ban on communist speakers - a position with which the students strongly disagreed. The subjects
were paid either small ($0.50) or large ($2.50) amounts of money to write this essay (the study was performed in
1967). Dissonance theory predicts that when justication for engaging in counterattitudinal behavior is weak (as
is the case when subjects are paid a small amount of money), then cognitive dissonance will be high, and subjects
will, as a result, be inclined to engage in attitudinal change as a means of providing additional justication for
their actions. Consistent with this prediction, Linder et al observed that subjects who had been given relatively
small amounts of money for writing the essay exhibited an attitudinal shift in favor of banning communist
speakers.
As part of their attempt to develop a computational model of cognitive dissonance, Schultz and Lepper
used CSNs to model the conditions associated with a number of cognitive dissonance experiments, including
those seen in the Linder et al study. They showed that CSNs could be used to model the prole of cognitive
changes seen across a number of cognitive dissonance research paradigms, including prohibition (where a subject
is prevented from engaging in a desired activity), initiation (where a cost is imposed on group membership) and
forced compliance (where a subject is coerced or induced to engage in counterattitudinal behaviors).
Although Schultz and Lepper's model correctly predicts the prole of cognitive changes seen in cognitive
dissonance experiments, its relevance to sensemaking processes may not be readily apparent. One reason why
the model was adopted as a computational model of sensemaking in the current case is because the kind of
cognitive changes seen in cognitive dissonance studies could be described as a response to situations in which
a subject is trying to make sense of observed behavior in terms of an underlying set of cognitions. In this
case, the subject is trying to account for their actions in terms of the cognitive factors that must have given
rise to those behaviors - the subject is essentially trying to make sense of their own behavior with respect to a
set of casually-signicant beliefs, attitudes and values. This may be seen as a specic example of the kind of
sensemaking that occurs when we try to make sense of the behavior of other people via (e.g.) causal attribution
mechanisms. Thagard and Kunda21 thus suggest that in making sense of both ourselves and others we rely on
cognitive mechanisms for maximizing coherence, and such mechanisms can be understood in terms of parallel
constraint satisfaction processes. Inasmuch as the subjects in cognitive dissonance experiments can be seen as
trying to make sense of their own behavior, then the success of Schultz and Lepper's model in accounting for the
results obtained in human experimental studies is clearly something that motivates its use in other sensemaking
contexts.
A second reason why Schultz and Lepper's model is attractive as a means of studying sensemaking phenomena
is because it sees cognitive change as motivated by the need to establish consistency between a set of variables
representing cognitions. When we focus on sensemaking, we can characterize cognitions in terms of the beliefs
that subjects hold about the features of some external state-of-aairs, such as the identity of a disease (in the
case of medical diagnosis) or the nature of a situation (in the case of intelligence analysis). When subjects have
partial access to this state-of-aairs, either because the available information is incomplete or uncertain, they must
make inferences that are consistent with observed information as well as background knowledge and experience.
Beliefs that are inconsistent or incompatible with one another, based on a subjects background knowledge and
experience, will serve as the impetus for cognitive change (i.e., belief revision). From the perspective of CSNs,
sensemaking processes can be modeled as the attempt to generate a prole of belief states (represented as the
activation of nodes across the network) that are maximally consistent with one another, subject to the prole of
inhibitory and excitatory links that connect the nodes. In the context of the sensemaking model outlined below,
nodes represent the beliefs that individual sensemakers can have within a domain of interest, links represent the
psychological association between specic beliefs (and reect the background knowledge and experience that a
sensemaker has in a domain), the activation of nodes at the start of a simulation represents the initial information
that sensemakers are provided with, and the prole of activation-related change in the nodes represents the
attempt of sensemakers to come to some cognitively-consistent interpretation of the initial information based
on their background knowledge. The prole of node activation at the conclusion of the simulation representsFigure 1. Organization of cognitive units in a single agent. Nodes in this diagram represent cognitive units, each of which
represents a belief held by the agent. Solid lines represent excitatory connections between the units, while broken lines
represent inhibitory links (all links are bidirectional). Colored circles, in this case, represent beliefs about the features of
a disease, while white circles represent beliefs about the disease type.
the cognitive outcome of the sensemaking process. The activation of some nodes will, in this case, be positive
(indicating that the subject holds the belief represented by the node), while the activation of other nodes will
be negative (indicating that the subject does not hold the belief represented by the node). In general, the set
of positive activations will represent the most cognitively-consistent or compatible set of cognitions the subject
could have generated relative to the initial body of information they were provided with.
3. COMPUTATIONAL MODEL
As stated in Section 2.3, the computational model developed to explore collective sensemaking in the current
paper is based on the model used by Schultz and Lepper.7 The current section provides an overview of the
computational model. Further details can be found in Schultz and Lepper7 and Smart and Shadbolt.22
Each agent within the model is implemented as a CSN based on the design specication outlined by Schultz
and Lepper. The nodes which make up each CSN at the agent level are organized into a number of cognitive
units, each of which represents a particular belief held by the agent. Fig. 1 illustrates the cognitive units that
might be created for an agent in the domain of medical sensemaking. In this case, the agent is furnished with
cognitive units representing the agent's beliefs about the presence of dierent symptoms, as well as the agent's
beliefs about the diseases responsible for those symptoms.
Within an individual agent, cognitive units can be connected to other cognitive units via inhibitory or
excitatory links. Whether the connection between two cognitive units is excitatory or inhibitory in nature depends
on the compatibility or consistency of the beliefs represented by the cognitive units. In the case of Fig. 1, we see a
prole of connectivity reecting an agents knowledge about the relationship between particular diseases and their
associated symptoms. Positively weighted links thus exist between the `Bacterial Pharyngitis' cognitive unit and
the units representing the presence of a sore throat and the presence of cervical lymphadenopathy (swollen lymph
nodes), while negatively-weighted links exist between the `Bacterial Pharyngitis' unit and units representing the
presence of a fever and rhinorrhea. Also note that a negative link connects the `Bacterial Pharyngitis' and `Viral
Pharyngitis' units. This reects the incompatibility between these beliefs in the context of single diagnostic
session. As a result of the negative association between these units, an agent presented with a set of symptoms
will be inclined to adopt the belief that the underlying disease is one of either bacterial or viral pharyngitis.
In addition to a sign, indicating whether a connection exerts an excitatory or inhibitory inuence on its target,
each connection has a weighting that determines the amount of inuence it exerts. The weighting assigned toFigure 2. The connectivity pattern for both positive (A) and negative (B) linkages between cognitive units. Excitatory
connections are symbolized by solid lines, inhibitory connections by dashed lines.
a link will determine the level of inuence a source cognitive unit has on a target unit, and this can be used to
indicate the strength of the association between dierent cognitions. In the case, of the CSN shown in Fig. 1,
for example, a stronger weighting could be assigned to the link connecting the `Cervical Lymphadenopathy' and
`Bacterial Pharyngitis' units as compared to the link connecting the `Cervical Lymphadenopathy' and `Viral
Pharyngitis' units. This would reect the fact that this particular symptom is more commonly associated with
bacterial forms of pharyngitis.
Cognitive units in Schultz and Lepper's model have a degree of internal complexity. Thus, rather than each
cognitive unit being represented by a single node, each unit in fact consists of two nodes that are connected
together in a mutual inhibitory fashion (see Fig. 2)y. One of these nodes is labeled as the `positive pole' (P), and
the other is labeled as the `negative pole' (N). The dierence in activation between these two nodes determines
the extent to which an agent holds the belief represented by the cognitive unit. Thus, if the activation of the
positive pole is high relative to the negative pole, then the net activation for the cognitive unit will be positive
and the agent can be said to possess the belief represented by the cognitive unit. Conversely, if the activation
of the negative pole is high relative to the positive pole, then the net activation for the cognitive unit will be
negative and the agent cannot be said to possess the belief represented by the cognitive unit.
The links between cognitive units are also architecturally complex. Each inter-cognition linkage is represented
by connections between the constituent nodes of the cognitive unit. Thus, an inter-cognition linkage is not a single
connection; instead, it consists of a total of eight connections (assuming bidirectional connectivity between the
units), with two connections emanating from each of the nodes in the two cognitive units. A positive connection
between cognitive units is represented by the wiring diagram shown in Fig. 2A, and a negative connection is
represented by the wiring diagram shown in Fig. 2B.
In addition to the connections between cognitive units within a single agent, connections can also exist
between dierent agents. These linkages are used to represent channels of communication between the agents
in a given model; they allow agents to communicate their current beliefs about a situation to other agents. The
nature of these inter-agent linkages resembles that those of inter-cognition linkages (see Fig. 2). For example, a
positively-weighted inter-agent connection will be implemented according to the wiring diagram seen in Fig. 2A.
In most cases, inter-agent connections connect cognitive units that represent the same kind of cognition. For
example, if a channel of communication is established between two agents with the cognitive architecture seen
yEach node also has an `auto-regulatory connection' that connects each node to itself (not shown in Fig. 2). The
function of this auto-regulatory link is to dampen the node's activity at each processing cycle (see Schultz and Lepper
7
for details).in Fig. 1, then the `Fever' unit in the source agent will be connected to the `Fever' unit in the target agent, the
`Sore Throat' unit in the source agent will be connected to the `Sore Throat' agent in the target unit, and so on.
Computational processing in each CSN starts with the activation of particular cognitive units at the beginning
of a simulation. This initial activation is deemed to represent an agent's beliefs at the outset of the simulation
(we assume that these beliefs are derived from some initial body of information that is provided to the agent).
Computational processing then occurs via the spreading of activation between the cognitive units of the CSN
according to the pattern of excitatory and inhibitory linkages. At each processing cycle in the simulation, the
activation of each node in the CSN is updated according to the following rules:
ai(t + 1) = ai(t) + neti(ceiling   ai(t)) (1)
when neti > 0, and
ai(t + 1) = ai(t) + neti(ai(t)   floor) (2)
when neti < 0.
In these equations, ai(t + 1) is the activation of node i at time t + 1, ai(t) is the activation of node i at time
t, ceiling is the maximum level of activation of the node (usually 1.0 for positive pole nodes and 0.5 for negative
pole nodes), floor is the minimum level of activation of the node (usually zero for all nodes), and neti is the net
input to node i, which is dened as:
neti = resisti
X
j
wijaj (3)
where aj is the activation of node j that is connected to node i, wij is the weighting associated with the
connection between i and j, and resisti is a measure of the resistance of node i to having its activation changed.
In general, the smaller the value of this parameter, the greater the resistance to activation change, and thus the
greater the resistance to cognitive change. One possible use of this parameter is to make certain types of beliefs
more or less resistant to change than others (see Section 5).
In each processing cycle of the simulation, n nodes are (typically) selected at random within each agent and
updated according to equations 1 and 2, where n corresponds to the number of nodes in each agent (the total of
number of nodes selected during a specic processing cycle is thus equal to the number of nodes in the model).
Agents are then allowed to communicate information to their connected peers (i.e., their immediate neighbors
in the communication network). Communication involves each agent sending a message to connected agents,
which contains information about the activation of nodes in the source cognitive unit. When all messages have
been sent, each agent processes the list of received messages and calculates the value of a parameter, called
comminputi, which is associated with every node. A variety of message processing functions are available to
support the calculation of comminputi; for example, the `MostTrustedAgent' function selects messages from the
most trusted communicating agent (as determined by the weight assigned to the connection between the agents)
and sets the value of comminputi to the activation value of nodes in this agentz.
At the next processing cycle, comminputi is incorporated into the activation equations by extending equation
3 as follows:
neti = resisti(
X
j
wijaj + comminputi) (4)
Once the communicated activation has been incorporated into the node's current activation level, comminputi
is reset to zero in order to avoid repetitive presentation of the same communicated information across successive
processing cycles.
zOther message processing functions can be selected by the user when setting up a simulation experiment (see Sec-
tion 4.4).Figure 3. The `Model' component of the Model Form as it appears within the CSSE. This part of the Model Form is used
to congure model parameters, a subset of which are shown in the property grid control on the right hand side of the
window.
4. SIMULATION CAPABILITY
In order to support experimental simulations into collective sensemaking using the aforementioned computational
model (see Section 3), we have developed a Windows-based desktop application called the Collective Sensemaking
Simulation Environment (CSSE). The CSSE is implemented using Microsoft's .NET framework, and it features
a graphical user interface that supports end-users with all aspects of the model conguration process. It also
enables end-users to setup and run simulation experiments, as well as visualize and export simulation results.
Subsequent sections describe the capabilities of the CSSE in more detail.
4.1 Model Creation
Fig. 3 shows the CSSE when a model is rst loaded into the application. As can be seen from Fig. 3, the CSSE
features a ribbon bar control along the top of the main application window. This provides access to common
model manipulation functions; for example, the controls in the `File' ribbon group on the left of the ribbon bar
enable the user to create new models, open existing models and save opened models to disk. Once a model is
loaded into the CSSE, it appears as a tabbed MDI child form within the main application window. This is called
the Model Form, and it is organized into four tabs, named `Model', `Agents', `Structure', and `Simulations'.
These tabs enable end-users to congure the model and setup simulation experiments according to their research
interests.
The rst tab, named `Model', is shown in Fig. 3. It allows users to provide a name and description for the
model, and it also provides access to model properties via a property grid control. These properties are common
to all models created using the CSSE. They enable users to, among other things, specify default weights for
inter-agent and inter-cognitive unit connections, set values for node resistance and control how cognitive units
are wired up to other cognitive units. A description of each of the properties appears in a text eld below the
property grid control whenever a model property is selected by the user.Figure 4. The `Agent' component of the Model Form as it appears within the CSSE. This part of the Model Form is used
to create the agents that are included in a computational model specication. The `Agent' tab also allows the user to
create, edit and congure each agent's cognitive units.
4.2 Agent Creation and Cognitive Unit Conguration
The second tab of Model Form, named `Agents', is shown in Fig. 4. This tab enables users to create, edit and
delete the individual agents that appear within the model. Agents that are currently dened in the model are
listed in a listbox control - the Agent Listbox - on the left hand side of the window. Whenever a specic agent is
selected from the Agent Listbox, the cognitive units for that agent are listed in another listbox - the Cognitive
Unit Listbox - on the right hand side of the window. The user can create, edit and delete the cognitive units for
any given agent by selecting items from a popup menu that appears when the user right clicks within the bounds
of the listbox (see Fig. 4). When the user selects the `Edit' menu item from the popup menu, they are presented
with the dialog box shown in Fig. 4. This enables the user to congure all the properties associated with an
individual cognitive unit; for example, the weight assigned to intra-cognitive unit connections. The properties
established for a single cognitive unit can be copied to all cognitive units within the same agent (or all agents
within the same model) by selecting options from within the dialog box (the same functionality is also provided
by the `Standardise Anatomy' menu option, which is accessible from the aforementioned popup menu).
The bottom right hand side of Fig. 4 shows a datagrid control, which is used to congure the connectivity of
cognitive units within a single agent. Whenever a user selects a cognitive unit from the Cognitive Unit Listbox,
the datagrid shows all other cognitive units within the same agent that are connected to the selected cognitive
unit. The user can then edit the weights assigned to these connections using the datagrid control. As mentioned
before, the weights assigned to the inter-cognitive unit connections indicate the strength of a psychological
implication or association between cognitions (e.g., beliefs). If the user wants to specify that no psychological
implication or association exists between two cognitive units, as might be the case in domains where some beliefs
are independent of one another, then the weight assigned to the inter-cognitive unit connection can be set to
zero.Figure 5. The `Network' component of the Model Form as it appears within the CSSE. This part of the Model Form is
used to congure the communication network that allows agents to communicate with one another during the course of a
simulation. The `Network' tab features the Network Structure Control, which provides a drawing canvas, enabling users
to manually congure the communication links that exist between agents.
4.3 Communication Network Conguration
Fig. 5 shows the third tab of the Model Form, which is named `Network'. This tab enables the user to congure
the structure of the communication network that exists between agents using what is called a Network Structure
Control. The agents currently dened within the model are listed in a listbox on the left hand side of the window,
and users can select agents from this list and add them to the drawing canvas on the right hand side of the
window. Once visible on the drawing canvas, the user can establish connections between agents by selecting
the source and target agents using the mousex. Existing connections can be deleted by right-clicking on the
connection and selecting the `Delete Connection' option from a popup menu (see Fig. 5). The CSSE provides
a number of shortcuts to support the conguration of communication networks. Firstly, users have the option
of connecting all agents that are visible on the drawing canvas. Secondly, users can use a drop-down menu
option available from the main ribbon bar control, which allows them to create four types of network structure
topology, namely fully-connected, small-world, random and ring topologies. In this case, the network structure is
established over all agents dened within the model, rather than just those agents shown on the drawing canvas.
As mentioned in Section 3, communication links between agents assume the form of connections between the
corresponding cognitive units in each agent (e.g., a `Fever' unit in the source agent will establish a connection
with the `Fever' unit in the target agent). The user can edit the structure of these inter-cognitive unit linkages,
as well as the weights assigned to the linkages, by selecting the `Edit Connection' option that appears in the
popup menu associated with a link on the drawing canvas (see Fig. 5). This will display a dialog box to the
xWhenever agents are connected to at least one other agent, the color of the icon representing the agent in the CSSE
changes from yellow to blue. This provides the user with a visual cue as to what agents are incorporated into the
communication network.Figure 6. The `Simulation' component of the Model Form as it appears within the CSSE. This part of the Model Form is
used to create, congure and execute simulation experiments.
end user, which provides complete control over how cognitive units are connected in the context of an inter-
agent communication link. Specic connections could be deleted, for example, in order to prevent inter-agent
communication about particular cognitions (this could be used to represent situations in which an agent wishes
to keep some beliefs private - see Section 5). Alternatively, cognitive units could be wired up in a such a way that
dierent kinds of cognition are connected (e.g., a `Fever' cognitive unit in the source agent could be connected to
the `Rhinorrhea' unit in the target agent). This state-of-aairs could be used to implement a primitive form of
miscommunication between the agents where one agent intends to communicate information about a particular
belief but this is misinterpreted by another agent as providing information about a dierent belief (see Section 5).
In addition to supporting the conguration of the communication network, the Network Structure Control
also provides a number of visual formatting options. The width, color and style of the connections between
agents can be edited using options available from a toolbar situated above the drawing canvas, and the value of
these properties can be specied for particular types of connection (e.g., the user could render excitatory and
inhibitory connections between agents using dierent colors). Snapshots of the network structure diagram can
be exported as images for use in other applications.
4.4 Simulation Setup and Execution
The fourth tab of the Model Form, named `Simulation', is shown in Fig. 6. This tab enables the user to create,
congure and execute simulation experiments. Individual simulation experiments are listed on the left hand side
of the window in a listbox control - the Simulations Listbox. When a particular simulation experiment is selected,
the user can edit its properties via the tabbed control on the right hand side of the window. These properties are
organized into a number of categories, which are indicated by the labels assigned to the tabs within the tabbed
control. These categories are as follows:
 General Properties. This set of properties includes the number of trials to perform as part of the
simulation and the number of processing cycles to implement as part of each trial. Other properties inthis category determine whether agents are allowed to communicate on every cycle of the simulation and
whether specic kinds of communication network topology (e.g., a small-world topology) is created anew
at the beginning of each trial. The user can also select from a list of `message processing functions' in order
to specify how the messages sent from communicating agents are processed by the receiving agent.
 Initial Activation Values. These properties determine the initial activation values assigned to specic
cognitive units at the beginning of each trial within a simulation. As indicated in Fig. 6, the user can
select cognitive units from particular agents and specify an initial activation value for both the positive
and negative poles of the cognitive unit.
 Custom Connection Weights. These properties specify connection weights between the cognitive units
of agents that are connected within a communication network. These weights override those that are
established using the Network Structure Control (see Section 4.3). The reason for allowing users to
override connection settings in the context of a particular simulation is due to the fact that a user may
want to adjust the communication links across multiple simulations that are executed against the same
model. If this feature was not provided, the user would have to create multiple copies of the same model
and distribute simulations across multiple model les.
 Suppress Communication for Cognitive Units. These properties allow the user to suppress commu-
nication for particular cognitive units across all cycles of a simulation. This may be important in cases
where the user wants to explore the eect of restricted communication proles, in which some subset of
beliefs is kept private.
Once a simulation has been created and congured, it can be executed by clicking the `Run Simulation'
button that appears on the main ribbon bar control. This will bring up a dialog box that enables the user to
control the execution of ongoing simulations. Using this dialog box, users can suspend, resume and cancel the
execution of ongoing simulations.
Simulations are run in a separate process from the CSSE in order to allow the user to continue working on
simulation models. When a simulation has completed, the results are stored in a user-specied directory on the
host machine.
4.5 Results Visualization and Data Export
The results of simulation experiments can be viewed using a secondary application that ships with the CSSE.
The main purpose of this application is to allow the user to view the results of simulations, and to this end,
it provides access to a datagrid control that supports a rich range of ltering, grouping, sorting, searching and
data manipulation capabilities. It also enables users to view the activation prole of individual cognitive units or
groups of cognitive units across the course of a simulation. Whenever a group of cognitive units is selected, the
grid control shows the mean, standard deviation, and standard error of the net activation values for the cognitive
units within the group.
In order to support more advanced forms of data visualization and analysis, the user can export the simulation
results to another application. At the present time, three kinds of export format are supported: Excel workbooks,
comma-separated value (CSV) les and HTML. In the case of the Excel export option, the data from the
simulation is stored in a series of spreadsheets that form part of the workbook. The user can either use the
built-in analysis and visualization options available within the Excel environment or they can export the data
to another compatible application for further analysis, e.g., SPSS.
5. EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF SOCIO-TECHNICAL FACTORS ON
COLLECTIVE SENSEMAKING: FOCUS AREAS FOR EXPERIMENTAL
SIMULATION
To date, the model described here has been used to examine the eect of factors such as communication frequency
and communication network structure on collective sensemaking.22,23 In one study, for example, Smart and
Shadbolt22 examined the eect of a number of communication variables on sensemaking performance. Theresults obtained from this study suggested that precipitant forms of information sharing may result in agents
assigning undue signicance to information that is largely consistent or compatible with pre-existing or prevailing
cognitions.
In another study, Smart23 explored the eect of dierent communication network structures on minority
inuence in collective sensemaking situations. This study used four types of communication network topology,
namely, disconnected, random, small-world and fully-connected topologies. The results from this study suggested
that network topology can inuence the extent to which minority views are integrated into collective judgements.
In particular, fully-connected networks deliver a performance prole in which minority inuence is minimized in
situations where both minority and majority groups are exposed to weak evidence. However, the same networks
serve to maximize minority inuence when minority group members are selectively exposed to strong evidence.
These results suggest that fully-connected networks dierentially regulate minority inuence based on the kinds
of evidence presented to both minority and majority group members.
Aside from studies investigating factors such as communication network structure, communication frequency
and minority inuence, a number of other factors are important foci of research attention for those interested
in collective sensemaking. Many of these factors relate to features of the sociotechnical environment in which
sensemaking occurs. For example, in military coalition contexts we are often in interested in how factors such
as cultural dierences, inter-agent trust and miscommunication aect collective sensemaking processes. The
following list provides an overview of how the computational model presented here could be applied to support
research into the eect of these (and other) factors.
 Cultural Dierences. One way of viewing cultural dierences is to see them as reecting statistically-
signicant dierences in the cognitive structures associated with the members of dierent cultural groups.24
Given that inter-cognition linkages within a single agent reect that agent's knowledge and experience of
a domain, the introduction of inter-agent dierences in the way (intra-agent) cognitive units are connected
may provide one way to investigate the impact of cultural dierences on collective sensemaking processes.
Cultural dierences could thus be represented by creating groups of agents with dierent kinds of connec-
tivity between cognitive units. For example, a strong positive connection between two cognitive units in
agents of one cultural group may exist as a weak negative connection between agents in a dierent cul-
tural group. This will lead agents to process information in dierent ways and (perhaps) come to dierent
conclusions given the same body of external information.
 Inter-Agent Trust. One interpretation of the weight value assigned to inter-agent linkages is that it
represents the degree of trust between agents. High trust between agents is thus reected in links that
have high weight values, and low trust is reected in links that have low weight values. By introducing
variable weights for the linkages that connect agents, we can vary the amount of inuence they exert over
one another during the course of a simulation. Dierent values could also be specied for each channel of
communication between two agents. This would correspond to a situation in which agents had dierent
levels of trust in one another with respect to particular kinds of beliefs.
 Miscommunication. Miscommunication can be represented in the model by connecting dierent cog-
nitive units (in dierent agents) together either on a permanent or intermittent basis. Under normal
circumstances, connections should exist between cognitive units that represent the same kind of cognition.
If a connection exists between cognitive units that represent dierent kinds of cognition, then communi-
cation will cause the listening agent to have a cognitive state that is dierent from that intended by the
talking agent.
 Selective Communication. Agents do not have to communicate the state of all their beliefs during the
course of inter-agent communication. They could, for example, restrict their communication to particular
kinds of beliefs. This would enable some agents to maintain a degree of privacy with regard to some
beliefs. One case where this may be important is in situations where (e.g.) security constraints prohibit
the communication of information to other agents. The notion of privately held beliefs and opinions is also
something that is important in computer simulation studies of social inuence.16 In terms of the current
model of collective sensemaking, this mode of selective communication can be established by removing thecommunication links associated with particular cognitive units (or by setting the weight assigned to the
link to zero).
 Resistance to Social Inuence. In Section 3, we encountered a parameter, called resisti, which is a
measure of the resistance of node i to having its activation changed. The value of this parameter can be
changed in order to control the susceptibility of an agent to socially-mediated cognitive change. Studies
manipulating this parameter could be useful for investigating issues of social inuence in situations where
beliefs are dierentially resistant to change. Previous research in this area has investigated the eect of
cognitive resistance in minority inuence. Xie et al,25 for example, show how the prevailing majority
opinion in a population can be rapidly reversed by a minority of agents who consistently proselytize the
opposing opinion and are immune to social inuence.
6. CONCLUSION
Cognitive processing in organizational settings is often a collective endeavor. More often than not, activities
such as planning and decision-making require the coordinated eort of multiple individuals working together.
The socially-distributed nature of cognitive processing in these task contexts means that a variety of factors
have the potential to inuence cognitive outcomes. The current paper has presented a computational model
of one particular aspect of cognitive processing, namely collective sensemaking. This modeling eort provides
the basis for computer simulations that can be used to provide some initial insight into how collective cognitive
outcomes are inuenced by social, technological and organizational factors. When combined with empirical
studies using human subjects, the output from this work can be used to support the eort to develop techniques
and technologies that maximize the collective cognitive processing potential of individuals engaged in sensemaking
activities.
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